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WASHINGTON LEGISLATION-1961
conscious of the necessity for a device by which the supreme court may
in times of emergency due to illness or disqualification of a judge, or
because of the press of work, call in qualified people to act as temporary
judges in order that the courts might carry on their work expeditiously
and proficiently. By joint resolution, the legislature has placed before
the people at the next election, a proposed constitutional amendment
which, if approved by the electorate, will authorize a majority of the
judges of the supreme court to call upon judges or retired judges of
courts of record of this state to perform judicial duties in the supreme
court on a temporary basis. While not as broad as the Judicial Council
proposal, this resolution, if approved, will eliminate the unhappy 4-to-4
decision and provide the additional man power needed by the court
to stay on top of its case load. Every effort should be made by the
bench and bar to assure the approval of this measure by the people.
GEORGE NEFF STEVENS
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
Conditional Sales of Personal Property - Filing. Chapter 1591
amends RCW 63.12.010, the conditional sale filing statute. Two im-
portant changes are made by the amendment. The period during which
an unfiled conditional sale contract is effective against creditors of
and transferees from the vendee is increased from ten days to twenty
days. The range of transactions which are totally exempt from the
filing requirement is much expanded. All conditional sales "wherein
the total designated unpaid purchase price does not exceed the sum of
two hundred and fifty dollars" are excepted, "and such contracts or
leases shall be valid as to all bona fide purchasers, pledgees, mortgagees,
encumbrancers and subsequent creditors.... ." Under the earlier
statute the critical figure was fifty dollars.
In extending the period during which an unfiled conditional sale is
valid this legislation is retrogressive. It creates another, difference in
the procedures by which the conditional sale and the chattel mortgage
(as to which the free-period remains ten days) are created and per-
fected and each such difference is a trap for the unwary businessman
or lawyer. It makes the effecting of a record title check on a chattel
virtually impossible. The justification for the change is not readily
apparent but is presumably the convenience of dealers who are remote
from county seats. It is curious to find that the ten-day period, which
iWash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 159.
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was adequate when transportation media were considerably more rudi-
mentary, has now become inadequate.
In exempting transactions in which the unpaid price does not exceed
two hundred and fifty dollars the legislature has in effect removed from
the recording system a major segment of consumer goods retailing on
a secured-credit basis. In practice the conditional sale, which has pretty
well pre-empted this field already, will of course become the only kind
of security transaction used. The modern trend appears to be in the
direction taken by this part of chapter 159. The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, which has already been enacted in thirteen' states and which
seems destined to become the law in most if not all of the states, excepts
from its filing requirements security transactions in consumer goods,
and in farm equipment having a purchase price below $2,500.002.
Crops - Lien for Supplier of Fertilizer, Pesticide, Weed Killer.
Chapter 264'adds another to the long and steadily growing list of statu-
tory liens. The new lien attaches to crops and the proceeds thereof and
is as to crops the fifth type of statutory lien.'
Protected by chapter 264 liens are persons who furnish "commer-
cial fertilizer, and/or pesticide, and/or weed killer to another for use
on the lands owned, contracted to be purchased, used or rented by him."
The lien attaches to "all the crops on which the fertilizer, and/or
pesticide, and/or weed killer are used." Since the supplier of such ma-
terials will not ordinarily specify in the sale transaction the geographic
areas of their application, identification of harvested crops with the land
areas treated by the materials in question should occasion some spirited
controversies. Where more than one seller is involved the opportunities
for complicated litigation are obvious.
Notice of chapter 264 liens must be filed within thirty days after the
commencement of deliveries, and the lien attaches "as of the date of
such filing." In these details the new statute is in conformity with some
of the earlier lien statutes, and not with others. The Washington code
exhibits a remarkable diversity in its provisions concerning the filing
times and effective dates for the different liens.'
2 Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Wyoming.
3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302.
1 Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 264.
2 The others are: RCW 60.12.010 (farm labor, contract haulers, contract har-
vesters) ; RCW 60.12.020 (landlord) ; RCW 60.12.180 (seed supplier) ; RCW 60.14.010
(dusting or spraying).
3 See Note, 30 WASH. L. REv. 198 (1955), particularly footnotes 9 and 10.
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The provisions of chapter 264 concerning the proceeds of crops in
which the lien existed are unusual in lien statutes. The statute reads:
If the crop, or any part thereof, is sold subsequent to the filing of the
lien, or possession delivered to an agent, broker, cooperative agency or
other person to be sold or otherwise disposed of and its identity lost, or
the crop commingled with other property so that it cannot be segre-
gated, and if the purchaser, agent, broker, cooperative agency or other
person is notified of the filing of the lien by being served with a certi-
fied copy thereof, the lien shall attach to the proceeds of the sale of the
crop or part thereof remaining in the possession of the purchaser, agent,
broker, cooperative agency or other person at the time of the notice and
to any proceeds of such sale that may thereafter come into the possession
of any of such persons and the lien shall be as effective as against such
proceeds as against the crop itself.
It will be observed that this passage does not purport to create a lien
in proceeds which are in the hands of the debtor.
Extension of the crop lien to proceeds raises some serious questions.
Were it not for this part of chapter 264 it could be assumed that the
lienor would by reason of his filing be protected against agents or suc-
cessors of the debtor. The protection would take several forms. So long
as the property could be traced and identified it could be foreclosed
against. Persons wrongfully exercising dominion over the property
would be liable in trover.4 Identifiable proceeds in the hands of the
debtor or in the hands of his agent could be directly reached on a theory
of trust' and a trustee in bankruptcy for the debtor or agent would take
the bankrupt estate subject to the lienor's equity.6 Loss of identity
would, however, bar pursuit of proceeds on a trust theory." Does chap-
ter 264, in creating a legal lien in proceeds in the hands of purchasers
from and representatives of the debtor, mean that the lien is to be the
lienor's sole interest in proceeds? Arguably it does, and the lienor can-
4 The chattel mortgage cases would appear to be apposite. The mortgagee can
maintain trover against one who converts the goods. Cashmere Valley Bank v. Pacific
Fruit & Prod. Co., 198 Wash. 363, 88 P.2d 579 (1939); Spokane Security Fin. Co.
v. Crowley Lumber Co., 152 Wash. 697, 279 Pac. 103 (1929) ; Union State Bank v.
Warner, 140 Wash. 220, 248 Pac. 394 (1926) ; John Smith Co. v. Hardin, 133 Wash.
194, 233 Pac. 628 (1925).
5 For a discussion of a comparable situation see Annot., Right of Chattel Mort-
gagee in Respect of Proceeds of Sale of Mortgaged Property by Mortgagor, 36 A.L.R.
1379 (1925). See also RCW 63.16.080, which makes a pledgor of a book account a
trustee for the proceeds of the account.
6 A trustee in bankruptcy takes the estate subject to such equitable interests. COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY § 70.25 (14th ed. 1942). Where the ultimate seller is an "agent, broker,
cooperative agency or other person," and such seller becomes a bankrupt, the debtor
can reach identifiable proceeds as the principal, and the lienor should have a like
position.
7 The problem is acute only when the "trustee" becomes insolvent. For a discussion
of the bankruptcy cases, see Come, BANKRUPTCY §§ 60.18, 60.24, 70.25 (14th ed. 1942).
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not sue in trover or attempt to follow proceeds as a trust fund. If the
statutory interest is exclusive it will no doubt remain exclusive even
though it becomes worthless by reason of inability to identify proceeds.
Without identifiable proceeds, the statutory lien cannot exist. Chapter
264 does not create a lien in general assets as a substitute for the lien
in specific proceeds which are not identifiable, and in this particular
must be contrasted with the UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 10,
RCW 61.20.100.8
Application of the proceeds-lien to purchasers from the debtor pre-
sents another difficult problem. The "proceeds" will be simply the
unpaid purchase price. Can a lien attach to the purchaser's promise
to pay? If the purchaser becomes a bankrupt, is there any part of his
assets in which the lienor can claim a lien? The answers to these ques-
tions would appear to be in the negative. If there is no lien as to the
purchaser there can be no lien in the money or check received by the
debtor from the purchaser.
As to an "agent, broker, cooperative agency or other person,"
"proceeds" seems clearly enough to mean the avails of their disposi-
tion of the property and such disposition will ordinarily be as a rep-
resentative of the debtor. The character of the avails suggests addi-
tional difficulties. These avails will be money or negotiable instruments
(checks, perhaps notes or drafts) or book accounts. Does chapter 264
fasten on such assets a lien which will follow them into the hands of
a successor of the "agent, broker, cooperative agency or other person?"
A construction of this statute which would subordinate a bona fide
taker of money for value or a holder in due course of a negotiable
instrument to the chapter 264 lien may be very hard to establish in
litigation. Even as to book accounts, absence of compliance with the
filing statute' should be fatal to an attempt to fasten on book accounts
a chapter 264 lien which would be good as against a bona fide assignee.
The important matter of priorities is covered by two provisions in
chapter 264. These are so phrased as to make litigation about their
operation a reasonable expectation. The critical language reads:
8 This statute, according to what appears to be the better construction, creates not
only a lien in identifiable proceeds of entrusted goods, but also a general lien of limited
duration in all the trustee's assets. See In re Harpeth Motors, 135 F. Supp. 863 (1955) ;
Commerce Union Bank v. Alexander, 312 S.W.2d 611 (Tenn. 1957). Cf. In the
Matter of Crosstown Motors, Inc., 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
811 (1960), in which this section was held to create only a priority as to the general
assets. The Harpeth case is the subject of casenotes in 34 Cssr.-KENT L. REv. 294(1956), and 69 HARV. L. REV. 1343 (1956). The Crosstown Motors case is discussed
in casenotes in 58 MIcH. L. REv. 783 (1960), and 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 954 (1960).
9 RCW 63.16.
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PROVIDED, That if the commercial fertilizer, and/or pesticide,
and/or weed killer is furnished to any tenant farmer, the lien shall apply
only to the tenant farmer's interest in the crops unless written consent
of the owner of the premises is obtained:
PROVIDED FURTHER, That such lien shall be subordinate to any
crop lien or crop mortgage which has been filed for record prior to the
furnishing of such materials or products.
What does this language mean, in the instance of a landlord? The
legal situation apart from chapter 264 is a composite of two proposi-
tions. The landlord under a crop-rental lease is a tenant in common
with the lessee as to undivided crops."0 He has by reason of RCW
60.12.030, a lien on all the crops. This lien secures his right to receive
his share of the crops under a crop-rental lease or his right to be paid
under a money-rent lease. The phrase in chapter 264, "the lien shall
apply only to the tenant farmer's interest in the crops unless written
consent of the owner... is obtained" is not readily implemented with
these propositions. What is the "tenant's interest" which measures the
chapter 264 lien as against a non-consenting landlord? To what interest
does the lien attach as against a consenting landlord?
Arguably the phrase "tenant's interest" can have a field of applica-
tion only in a crop-rental lease under which the tenant has an "interest,"
i.e., a share. Under a money-rental lease the tenant is the owner and as
to an owner the word "interest" would be quite inappropriate. So con-
strued, chapter 264 provides a lien on all of the crops if the landlord
"consents," and on the tenant's share if the landlord does not consent.
This construction is supported by the fact that the phrase "such lien
shall be subordinate to any crop lien.., which has been filed for record
prior to the furnishing of such materials or products" does not except
the landlord's lien from the term "crop-lien." It was apparently the
legislative purpose to preserve the lien of a consenting landlord and
to make its operation turn on the filing. The words "the lien shall apply
only to the tenant farmer's interest in the crops unless the consent of
the owner of the premises is obtained" do not fairly mean "the lien
shall be prior to the landlord's lien if the landlord consents."
The word "consent" in this context is also obscure. Does it require
consent to have the lien attach to the landlord's share of the crops or
does it merely require consent to the tenant's use of the materials? The
latter seems an unreasonable and unlikely construction.
The phrase "such lien shall be subordinate to any crop lien or crop
10 See the discussion in Loudon v. Cooper, 3 Wn.2d 229, 100 P.2d 42 (1940).
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mortgage which has been filed for record prior to the furnishing of such
materials" does not specify the consequences if the fertilizer and so
forth is furnished before the crop lien or crop mortgage is filed. The
natural correlative of the quoted words would give priority to the chap-
ter 264 lien. At this point chapter 264 is again ambiguous. It is ifi
conflict with RCW 61.04.020 and with RCW 60.12.030.
RCW 61.04.020, the chattel mortgage filing statute, protects a crop
mortgage which is filed within ten days from the date of its execution.
If the mortgage is executed on March 1 and filed on or before March
10 it is prior to an interest in the property acquired after March 1. A
literal reading of chapter 264 gives priority to a lienor who furnishes
fertilizer, pesticide or weed killer after March 1 and prior to the filing.
Chapter 264 and RCW 61.04.020 cannot be reconciled. The controlling
legislative purpose is probably to be found in RCW 61.04.020. That
the legislature intended to amend the chattel mortgage filing statute
when enacting chapter 264 seems unlikely.
RCW 60.12 creates crop liens for the landlord, the farm laborer and
the provider of seed. RCW 60.12.030 states that these liens "shall be
preferred to any other encumbrance upon the crops to which they
attach."'" The landlord is given by RCW 60.12.040 until June 1 to file
a claim of lien against the current year's crop. The farm laborer is
given by RCW 60.12.040 a period of twenty days "after the cessation
of the work or labor" to file his claim of lien. The holder of a seed
lien created by RCW 60.12.180 is given by RCW 60.12.190 a period of
sixty days "after delivering the seed" within which to file. Chapter 264,
in subordinating its liens to prior crop liens which are of record when
the fertilizer, pesticide or weed killer is furnished, inferentially makes
11 It may be noted in passing that RCW 60.12 is itself a fine tangle of conflicting
propositions. RCW 60.12.010 creates a lien for farm laborers (including haulers and
harvesters) and goes on to provide: "That the interest of any lessor in any portion of
the crop raised on demised premises leased in consideration of a share of the crop
raised, shall not be subject to the lien provided for in this section." RCW 60.12.020
creates a lien for the landlord, whether his lease provides for a money or a crop rent.
It would appear that the landlord's lien is by reason of RCW 60.12.010 prior to the
laborer's lien as to a crop rent and of equal rank with it as to money rent. RCW
60.12.140 provides for pro rata distribution of the proceeds of foreclosure sale, among
the several holders of judgments in foreclosure actions brought under the chapter, but
evidently cannot apply where one of the judgments is had by a lienor who is given
priority elsewhere in the chapter. Utter confusion was introduced in 1955 with the
enactment of the seed-lien statute and the passage in RCW 60.12.030 reading: "[T]he
seed lien provided for in this chapter shall be superior to any lien except a labor lien."
This makes the seed lien prior to the lien of any kind of landlord, whereas the land-
lord's claim for a crop rental is prior to the lien of the laborer which is in turn prior
to the lien of the seed supplier. The landlord's claim for a cash rent is of equal rank
with the laborer's lien, which is in turn prior to the lien of the seed supplier, which is
in turn "superior to any lien except a labor lien."
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a chapter 264 lien prior to any crop lien not then of record. Chapter
264 and RCW 60.12 are in conflict. That the traditional priority for
the landlord and the farm laborer, and the relatively recent priority
obtained by seed lienors, will be surrendered without a fight to the liens
created by chapter 264, is not to be expected.
Still further difficulties are encountered, upon an attempt to reconcile
chapter 264 with RCW 60.14. RCW 60.14.010 creates liens for persons
who provide materials for "crop dusting or spraying crops for the pur-
pose of weed, disease, or insect control." RCW 60.14.020 permits filing
"within thirty days after the completion of harvest of crops sprayed or
dusted," and provides that the lien shall attach "as of the date of filing."
In normal course, RCW 60.14 liens would rank as of the date of filing,
with other liens which are not accorded specific statutory priority. Yet
chapter 264 liens appear to be given priority, not by a specific priority
provision, but by virtue of the correlative meaning of the passage read-
ing: ". . . such [chapter 264] lien shall be subordinate to any crop
lien... which has been filed for record prior to the furnishing of such
materials ... "
An even more fruitful source of controversy is the fact that chapter
264 and RCW 60.14 overlap. Materials used in "crop dusting or spray-
ing" for the purpose of "weed, disease, or insect control" will also be
"fertilizer, and/or pesticide, and/or weed killer." Since chapter 264
requires filing within thirty days after "the commencement of delivery
of such materials" and allows foreclosure within twelve months after
filing, whereas RCW 60.14 permits filing within thirty days after "the
completion of harvest" and requires foreclosure within eight months
after filing, a supplier of these materials may on occasion be able to
prevail only if he succeeds in showing that he has the one kind of lien
as opposed to the other. It will be interesting indeed to see how the
court resolves the problems of lien-identity created by this situation.
Maybe these suppliers now have two liens and can prevail on compli-
ance with either set of statutory requirements.
Real Property Mortgage Foreclosure -R edemption. Chapter
1961 amends RCW 6.24.140, reducing the period during which there
can be redemption after the sale of land in a mortgage foreclosure, from
one year to eight months. Mortgages executed after June 30, 1961 will
come within this chapter. The shorter period appertains, however, only
if two conditions are met. The mortgage must have declared "in its
terms that the mortgaged property is not used principally for agricul-
1 Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 196.
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tural or farming purposes," and the complaint in foreclosure must have
contained a waiver by the mortgagee of any right to a deficiency judg-
ment. Appropriate conforming modifications are also made by chapter
196 in RCW 6.24.160 (relating to successive redemptions and issuance
of a sheriff's deed), in RCW 6.24.210 (relating to possessory and other
interests during the statutory redemption period), and in RCW 61.-
12.070 (relating to deficiency judgments).
This patently ineffectual legislation is the only tangible progress so
far achieved in a drive which began in 1955, for reform of Washington's
obsolete and inefficient real property mortgage foreclosure system. The
evils at which this drive is directed are very real. Their correction is
highly important to the future development of the state.2 The basic
foreclosure statute of Washington dates from 1854. It provides for a
judicial proceeding and a sheriff's sale-a cumbersome, time-consuming
and expensive procedure which even in 1854 had been superseded in
several states by statutes and judicial decisions approving non-judicial
realization techniques for real property mortgages. This modernization
movement has now brought thirty-five states within the group which
do not require judicial foreclosure. Since 1869 Washington mortgage
foreclosures have been regulated by the general-execution-statute pro-
vision for redemption after the sheriff's sale. This is a feature unknown
to the common law or to equity, and one which is not a necessary feature
of mortgage realization, in some thirty states.
By reason of its continued adherence to both the judicial-proceding
type of foreclosure and also the redemption-after-sale type of mortgage
statute, Washington is close to achieving the position of being the state
in which it costs the most and takes the longest to realize on a real
property mortgage. This situation has serious implications for the
future, since the development of Washington depends in large measure
on the importation of mortgage money from other states.
The drawbacks in a foreclosure-by-action system are the obvious
ones, principally the delays and expense inherent in litigation and the
extended period which may intervene between the initiation of the
action and conclusion of a contested foreclosure. Even more objection-
able are the consequences of a post-sale redemption statute. Persons
interested in buying land are not attracted to the sale. They cannot
2 For general discussions of real estate mortgage realization techniques and problems,
see Bridewell, The Effect of Defective Mortgage Laws on Home Financing, 5 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 545 (1938) ; Comment, Statutory Redemption: The Enemy of Home
Financing, 28 WASH. L. REv. 39 (1953) ; Prather, Foreclosure of The Security Inter-
est, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 420; Prather, A Realistic Approach to Foreclosure, 14 Bus.
LAW. 132 (1958).
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buy the land. The most they can acquire is a chance. Bidding is stifled
by the risk, however remote, of redemption. Another pernicious by-
product of the redemption system is its impact on the calculations of fair
value which a bidder must make. If he gets title it will be at a later
date. The market value of the land may have deteriorated by then.
What the physical condition of the property will then be is unforesee-
able. These considerations make the sheriff's sale a farcial caricature
of a public auction. Every Washington mortgagor who is so unfortunate
as to reach foreclosure is penalized by these defects, since it is he who
must foot the bill for the expenses and he who suffers when the property
fails to bring its fair value.
It will be observed that chapter 196 strikes only at the post-sale
redemption and makes but a feeble gesture in that direction. A reduc-
tion from twelve to eight months in the redemption period is no remedy
for the existing evils. The practical utility of the new statute is further
reduced by the necessity that the mortgagee decide, perhaps months
before he can know if such a course is expedient, whether to forego his
right to a deficiency. A far more effective attack on the problems of
mortgage realization in Washington was made in a bill which was not
enacted. This was Senate Bill 120, which proposed a deed of trust
system. Under it, realization on a land mortgage by non-judicial pro-
cedures would have been legalized as an alternative to foreclosure by
action, and the interest of the mortgagor would have been protected
by a provision for a period of redemption before rather than after the
sale. The latter feature is especially notable, as it assures the mortgagor
who can redeem (few can)' of ample time within which to do so, and
also enables the mortgagor who cannot redeem to stir up some real
interest among prospective buyers of the property.
Senate Bill 120 excluded as does chapter 196 the mortgage on farm
land. This is an exclusion which makes a good deal of sense. The
farmer has crop-year problems which justify special treatment.
Although chapter 196 accomplishes little or nothing, its enactment
is an encouraging indication that the legislature is becoming aware of
the need for correction of the defects in our foreclosure statutes.
W. L. SHATTUCK
5 The infrequency with which the redemption right can be exercised amply demon-
strates that the redemption risk with its disturbing effect on foreclosure sales has
adverse effects which are out of all proportion to the benefits resulting to mortgagors.
A recent study conducted by the Washington Mortgage Correspondents Association
and covering the period Jan. 1, 1956-Jan. 1, 1960, disclosed that in a representative
group of 276 foreclosures there was but one redemption by a mortgagor and but two
redemptions by persons other than mortgagors.
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